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PREVENTING A RENEWABLE RESOURCE CURSE
Scott W. Lyons*

INTRODUCTION

n 2007, the largest African oil and gas discovery in a decade
was made off the coast of Ghana. 1 Aptly named "Jubilee,"
the field produced great excitement for the Ghanaian government. 2 Since production began in 2010, the economic benefits have become entrenched in Ghana's budget. 3 Moreover, this
production is expected to accelerate through late 2016, with fiscal estimates already included in national plans. 4 However, the
changes due to the sudden influx of petrodollars from the large
oil discovery are cause for concern. Recent history demonstrates
that the rapid flow of large revenue streams into a state with
weak institutions can produce more harm than good. 5 Ghana is
hastily creating and managing the necessary systems to handle
its newfound resource wealth to ensure that it does not suffer the
downfalls of other resource-rich states.6
The threats to Ghana are real. The sharp increase of nontax revenue collection breeds secrecy7 and counters public
accountability found
only with transparency, 8 thus producing an
establishment ripe for
corruption. 9 Meanwhile,
the financial windfall
only accrues to a select
few, while the national
per capita income does
not improve but in many
cases declines. 10 This
"resource curse" 11 does
not have to manifest,
as some states avoided
negative impacts through
strong institutional protections, but those states are exceptions. 12
Moreover, some of the same enabling factors apply to the new
massive investment in sustainable energy solutions. 13
Recently, spurred by international efforts to increase energy
independence and to combat global climate change, there are
new and substantial governmental subsidies for renewable and
clean energy worldwide. They have resulted in large flows of
investment, both private and public, into this new area of alternative energy resource development. 14 Initiatives, such as Power
A c..
inca, 15 and the South East Europe Energy Community Treaty
Plan, 16 have brought billions of dollars to areas that are in desperate need for energy. However, these areas do not necessarily
have the institutions nor the infrastructure to absorb this financial
investment. While these initiatives will add tens of thousands of
megawatts of cleaner and more efficient power, they may also
be accompanied by negative effects if they are not accompanied
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by necessary protections. 17 Thus, these states face a potentially
similar risk ofa resource curse as other resource-rich countries. ts
This Article explores the risks of new massive inflows
of wealth stemming from investment in clean and renewable
energy. First, this Article will discuss the principle of the natural
resource curse and the combined dynamics that result in negative
returns on resource wealth. Next, a discussion of the new investment in renewable energy, the enabling factors for a potential
clean energy curse, and specific examples that demonstrate an
emerging concern. Finally, the Article provides potential mitigating solutions taken from best practices in traditional resource
development and government institution strengthening.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOURCE CURSE

After years of extensive research and examination by economists and political scientists, there is general agreement that
states with abundant resource wealth generally perform worse
than states that have less
resources. 19 This greatly
paradoxical principle,
which has traditionally
focused on extractive
industries such as oil,
gas, and mining, reveals
that there are trade-offs
between resources on
one hand and economic
development and poverty
reduction on the other. 20
Known as the resource
curse, it goes against
conventional wisdom
that something providing great wealth and revenue is bad for
a state and its population. 21 While this curse is not an absolute
law of economics and development, there is a strong tendency
of negative results. 22 Original observations of the resource curse
reflected more broadly on the macroeconomic impact, such as
during the 1970s in the Netherlands, leading to the resource curse
to be termed early on as the "Dutch Disease."23 After the discovery of the Groningen oil fields, the Netherlands experienced a

"Known as the resource curse,
it goes against conventional
wisdom that something
providing great wealth and
revenue is bad for a state
and its population."
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significant inflation of its exchange rate and a subsequent related
decline in manufacturing, thus increasing dependency on fossil fuel wealth. 24 The applied macroeconomic dynamics of the
Dutch Disease were a failure to invest in diverse traditional
tradable commodities like manufactured goods or agricultural
products and the related infrastructure and education needed to
produce these type of goods. 25 The movement from a manufacturing and agricultural-based economy to one where the labor
is diverted to resource development raised production costs and
over time handicapped the economy. 26 While the Dutch Disease
narrowly describes the decline in manufacturing and agricultural
sectors as a result of a suddenly prosperous natural resource
sector, the resource curse refers to all hardships that result from
natural resource exports. 27
The evolution of the hardships encountered through the
resource curse began when the nationalization ofresource wealth
allowed energy-producing
nations to hide their revenues. 28 In the 1960s and
1970s, states moved away
from dominance by the
"Seven Sisters," the seven
international oil companies
that controlled ownership,
investment, and distribution of mineral resources,
and began to take control. 29
While the Seven Sisters
colluded to maintain price
stability, they also paid
taxes and royalties that
were accountable and transparent as sources of government revenue. 30 With
a change to a new larger scale of revenue through state-owned
models, and increased secrecy of that revenue, governments
were no longer held to the same levels of accountability. 31 The
states were then able to subsidize energy internally and provide
benefits to the population without need for taxation, which has
the combined effect of pacifying the population. 32 Thus, with the
accompanying lack of transparency regarding the nature of the
investments and resulting wealth, the government was uniquely
exposed, from a transparency perspective, to questionable contracts on one side and ill-coordinated decisions regarding capital
spending on the other side. 33
The recent investigations of the resource curse focus
~ot oqly on macroeconomic impacts related to exchange
rates l}nd labor- m~rket~, but more importantly on government
behavior stemming from the unanticipated large windfall of
revenue associated with discovery and exploitation of natural
resources. 34 A major component of the resource curse is rentier
politics. Rentier politics, which occur when a state receives sufficient revenues from external sources, allows a government to
maintain an illusion of effectiveness through lower taxes and
higher public spending. 35 In autocratic or partially democratic

nations, 36 the resource wealth is accompanied by increased
secrecy, 37 while reducing transparency, 38 freedom of the press, 39
and public accountability. 40 Since the revenue stream does not
come from taxes, it is easier to hide income, which eliminates
governmental accountability41 while quelling dissent through
patronage systems used to dampen possible rebellion. 42 In doing
so, these nations prevent the common transition to democracy. 4 3
These factors allow for endemic corruption and governmental
ineffectiveness. 44 Moreover, in less wealthy democracies with
weaker institutions, weaker legislatures, and weaker legal systems, very similar outcomes occur. 45 In this way, the resource
curse results from institutional failure, 46 making democracies
less democratic. 4 7
Despite varied efforts to eliminate discord through reduced
tax-collection, reduced freedoms, increased secrecy, and
increased public spending, a major part of the resource curse is
conflict, including a fiftypercent increase in civil war
and violent insurgencies. 48
Less wealthy nations have
a two-fold increase in the
risk of civil war, 49 which is
even more destructive than
these statistics show because
armed conflicts have a high
risk of restarting. 50 Again,
there are a multitude of
triggers, including public
distrust of revenue-hiding, 51
financial motivation to
commit resource-related
crimes, 52 and newfound
separatists in the oilproducing region with a
perceived greater claim to the spoils. 53 Since the 1970s, government resource revenues have spiked, leading to a greater risk of
civil conflict as insurgents have more to gain, 54 while the rising
energy prices encouraged private investors to enter increasingly
dangerous places, leading to a greater risk of rebellions. 55 Thus,
the resource curse has a corrosive element that makes bad governance worse, significantly limits a state's institutional capacity
development, and exposes the state to financial and political
instability. 56 From a government behavior perspective, the curse
contrasts the Dutch Disease, which has an entirely macroeconomic impact that could be overcome by better broad fiscal
policy and a diversified economy.
Discovery of resource wealth has not been a curse for all
countries. Developed states, such as Canada, mostly avoided the
curse through income diversification, strong institutions, democracy, and private economic power. 57 While the resource wealth
has exposed opportunities for corruption, even in developed
nations, the development of resources has been an overall benefit in those states. Indeed, democracy, in itself, does not ensure
avoidance of the curse, just as it does not ensure comparative
increases in government expenditures to raise the quality of life

"Thus, the resource curse
has a corrosive element
that makes bad governance
worse, significantly limits a
state s institutional capacity
development, and exposes
the state to financial and
political instability."
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of its population. 58 Corruption concerns are widespread in many
countries, both those with successful economies, democratic
and non-democratic states, and those with and without natural
resources. 59 Similarly, resource wealth in weaker and non-democratic states does not foresee all aspects of the resource curse.
Some less developed states have avoided major aspects of the
curse, including Mexico's transition to democracy in 2000. 60 The
concern exists, however, that vast newfound wealth opportunities from international sources accompanied by lack of financial
absorptive capacity, lack of transparency due to secrecy, and lack
of strong institutions to serve as a bulwark pose a risk to positive
development, democracy, and stability of a state. 61
CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENT AND RISKS

Many countries are seeing a massive spike in clean natural
resource development, including the United States, Japan, and
China, to foster energy independence, reliable energy sources,
and to combat pollution. 62 Currently, the greatest investment in
clean energy is focused on the states with the biggest gross domestic products ("GDPs") and largest energy needs. 63 However, the
massive increases in international clean energy investment in the
developing world with weaker institutions, including in Africa
and Southeast Europe, are subject to the biggest threats to a
clean energy curse. South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia are estimated to have received almost six billion dollars in clean energy
investment in 2014, and will reach almost eight billion dollars
in 2016. 64 These figures are after these states received a total
of one billion dollars in clean energy investment from 2006 to
2011. 65 Moreover, the United States is providing six billion dollars in export credits and government financing for clean energy
development in the Asia-Pacific region and unlocked over one
and a half billion dollars in clean energy financing through the
US-Africa Clean Energy Finance Initiative. 66
In 2006, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development launched a Sustainable Energy Initiative to finance
energy, including clean energy, in Southeast Europe. 67 Targeted
investment of billions of dollars has been directed towards the
Balkans through various mechanisms, including through the
Western Balkans Investment Framework. 68 This massive energy
investment is expected to continue upwards, with billions more
flowing over the next decade. There are currently five billion
Euros annually available in loans and grants for clean energy,
but the generous subsidies will continue to rise as all European
Union states must have one-fifth of their energy come from
renewable sources by 2020. 69 In 2013, China's investment in
renewable energy exceeded its investment in traditional resource
development. 70 Overall, there was $268 billion in clean energy
investment in 2013 and $310 billion in 2014.7 1 Compared to the
$2.3 trillion in petrodollars produced from pumping in 2009,
clean energy represents a small financial component of the natural resource market. 72 However, even while large energy investment has been persistent to meet population needs, the new
and exponentially growing surge of investment in clean energy
represents a new paradigm and is accompanied by new risks.
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The massive new investment in renewable energy arose for
many reasons. Until the drastic downturn in oil prices began in
the second half of 2014, the high prices for petroleum made the
need for alternative sources essential for states functioning in
the global market. 73 It is possible that 2015 will not experience
a significant increase in renewable energy investment due to
plunging oil prices, but in the long-run, the massive investment
will continue. 74 The International Energy Association predicts
that over the next twenty-five years, demand for energy will
rise by thirty-seven percent and this demand must be met. 75
Investment will continue for a variety of policy considerations,
including stated desire to curb air pollution caused by fossil
fuels and national security energy independence through domestic or regional energy production that reduces the need to import
oil from potentially hostile regimes. Further, in less developed
states, the need for electrification creates the demand for power
development from all resources, especially renewable sources.
More than two-thirds of the population in sub-Saharan Africa
does not have electricity, including over eight-five percent of
the rural population. 76 More than $300 billion in sub-Saharan
Africa alone is needed to create universal access to electricity
by 2030, which is essential for the region's economic growth. 77
While discoveries of oil and gas will enable some of the electrification, clean energy will play a considerable role. Additionally,
certain clean energy sources will allow some areas to skip ahead
to electrification without waiting for the expensive and lengthy
development of electric wire infrastructure. Whole rural villages
or cities maybe able to be self-contained in solar or wind energy
production benefitting from off-grid arrangements. 78 Just as cellular phones allowed for developing states to leap forward and
have comprehensive phone service without the need for investment in traditional phone line infrastructure, localized renewable
energy development can similarly allow for lesser developed
regions to achieve independent electrification. 79 Energy evolution is not something new, as the dominant sources of energy
have consistently changed throughout the centuries. 80 There have
been changes of dominance, with oil and natural gas replacing
coal and other traditional fuels, to the sudden recent spike in
nuclear power during the mid-to-late twentieth century and its
recent downturn from subsequent concerns following disastrous
events. 81 New forms of energy can grow quickly when they
become cost competitive, which has been the recent trend for
solar and wind energy. 82
While new forms of energy, especially clean energy, are a net
benefit to society, the ability of a state to harness resource wealth
can produce negative impacts when accompanied by massive
scale and lack of transparency without necessary institutional
controls. There are already nascent concerns in renewable energy
regarding corruption and direct economic benefits reaching the
population. For example, the massive direct subsidies for clean
energy and cash flows in China is undermining the integrity
of the process and has led to allegations of corruption. In May
2014, Wang Jun, head of China's National Energy Association's
renewable energy department was fired over a criminal investigation into bribe-taking. 83 Similarly, there are concerns regarding
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LA w &
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the forced investment of large amounts of money into states that
cannot necessarily absorb the investment and do not have the
institutions to prevent corruption and ensure that the population
secures most of the benefits. For example, in Italy, the Mafia
has infiltrated windfarm development due to lucrative subsides
and ability to leverage the market. 84 Criminal opportunities will
follow exposed wealth creation and the Mafia has been stealing millions of dollars from the European Union and Italian
government. 85 There have been examples all over Europe where
the renewable energy market has been infiltrated by criminal
elements due to the subsidies. 86 In the Canary Islands, eight government officials were indicted for bribery and abuse of office
connected to securing the lucrative European Union subsidies. 87
Other examples can be found throughout Southern Europe. 88
Renewable energy is even being used to launder criminal money
from other illicit sectors. 89 The extensive fraud and criminality
demonstrates the need
for strengthened laws
and regulations, since
renewable energy is
comparatively poorly
regulated.
Weak
policies
related to subsidies also
provide opportunities
for improper gains.
In India, a return of
investment criteria
guaranteeing profit in
tariff setting provided
perverse incentives that
benefitted the investors
at the expense of the
public. 90 Renewable
energy is also starting to
see some of the corruption-related concerns of
traditional resources, in which the political elites have access to
illicit wealth due to centralized control of information, the lack
of transparency in investment and bribery to secure government
access. For example, in Albania, key land was purchased by the
daughter of the Prime Minister right before it was chosen for a
clean energy project, and separately, the Deputy Prime Minister
was recorded trying to corrupt a hydroelectric project. 91 In that
case, there was video taken of the minister counting money from
a briefcase after being asked to favor a certain company in the
development of a hydroelectric plant. 92

destinations, the concerns related to scale, transparency and
source exist. If there are weak institutions that cannot safeguard
all aspects of the resource exploitation and revenue, the way
decisions are made and how the sector is governed still matter.
Even in renewable energy, corruption and improper government actions and benefits are rampant. 93 This demonstrates that
changing from a conventional extractive fuel economy to clean
energy does not change the governance issues, and therefore the
inherent threats to the state.
A parallel concern relates to the complexity of the tendering and contracting process and labor production. Energy
procurement agreements are of high value (worth potentially
tens or hundreds of millions), but are subject to asymmetrical
highly technical information and limited citizen input or oversight.94 The renewable energy contracting process is at risk due
to opaque and complicated financing and subsidies coupled
with extensive permitting and licensing. Any
time there is secrecy in
large-scale contracting,
the citizens of the state
cannot ensure that no
bribes were paid, that
the project was the right
investment, and that
the generated wealth
will benefit the whole
population. 95 Further, a
system lacking transparency could drive away
reputable investors, raise
costs, waste resources,
distort markets, and
divert public interests to
private gain. 96 Any large
energy project could
lead to the enrichment
of a narrow few without the wealth accruing to all. The concerns
are even greater when one state is selling large amounts of its
clean energy production to neighboring states. Energy development limitations are also applied to the labor market. Natural
resource development is notorious for having few labor needs
once the production is established and utilizing foreign labor
sources during the initial project development phase. 97 Thus, the
domestic population of the state has little interaction with the
actual energy production and only see the tangible benefits from
the untaxed or heavily subsidized domestic transmission.
Finally, as noted, any time enormous unchecked financial
flows come into a state with insufficient absorptive capacity,
opportunities for illicit gains, political competition for access to
the spoils, and diversion of wealth proliferate. Renewable energy
has opportunities for leakage at various steps in the development
process, which provide incentives for those in government and
with access to the wealth to stay in power by any means and limit
transparency, reinforced through patronage and suppression. 98

"While new forms of energy,
especially clean energy, are a
net benefit to society, the ability
of a state to harness resource
wealth can produce negative
impacts when accompanied
by massive scale and lack of
transparency without necessary
institutional controls."

Many of the concerns related to large-scale clean energy
production mirror the concerns of extractive resource production: that centralized control, poor institutions, and lack of deliberate, transparent, and inclusive decision making processes may
produce poor project outcomes and possible serious negative
impacts. While the clean energy development will be a net positive for electrification, the climate, and environmental improvement, and the production benefits are not shipped to far away
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When resource wealth can be appropriated, groups may vie
for access and control, and rent-seeking behavior may occur. 99
Clean energy is experiencing billions of dollars in infrastructure
project investment flowing into developing states with weak
institutions. 100 As shown by the proliferation of clean energyrelated corruption incidents, the current system does not sufficiently protect the financial flows.
SOLUTIONS

Some donor states are already taking steps to mitigate the
potential risks associated with massive energy development in
states with poorer institutional structures. 101 This is an essential
step and should receive appropriate attention. However, more
can and should be done on all fronts to mitigate the core contributing elements of secrecy and related transparency, state control
of the source of wealth, and scale.
EXPANSION OF TRANSPARENCY TO PREVENT SECRECY

Secrecy and lack of transparency are both possible contributing causes to the resource curse and potential negative results
from the curse. To combat the curse, transparency is essential at
all steps of the renewable energy development. Transparency initiatives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
("EITI") 102 and the Publish-What-You-Pay 103 campaign, which
are currently geared solely towards extractive industries, can be
expanded or have their principles applied to renewable energy.
These are voluntary multi-stakeholder campaigns supported by
governments, international corporations, and international nongovernmental organizations. 104 EITI was designed not only to
help transparency generally, but also to mitigate the resource
curse through reduction of secrecy and corruption. 105 The EITI
framework follows essential principles of transparency and government accountability, but the fundamental element is that a
state joining EITI must disclose revenue and payments received
from extractive industry corporations operating within its borders.106 While being voluntary, this initiative helps the state's
citizens know what revenue is being received and prevent revenue from being hidden. Although EITI compliance is limited by
its voluntary participation, any opportunity to reduce secrecy in
renewable energy is similarly vitai. 107 Further, the Publish-WhatYou-Pay campaign, a civil society-driven initiative to encourage
corporate reporting of payments to the state to enable reconciling of funds, would further enable clean energy transparency. 108
The key elements besides EITI-like reporting requirements
are also having transparency in all aspects of the procurement,
concessions and permitting. This helps ensure that the most
capable corporation is charged with the renewable energy development and increases the likelihood of higher quality service
delivery and distribution of the benefits. 109 The greatest impact
though is the reduction of corrupt incidents, such as those experienced in many South European states.
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act 110 into law in 2010, it included
in its "Miscellaneous Provisions" a requirement under Section
1504 111 requiring corporations listed with the Security and
Exchange Commission to disclose payments made to foreign
8

governments for resource extraction rights. 112 This section, also
known as the Cardin Lugar Amendment, was in direct response
to Congressional concerns related to the resource curse. 113
Section 1504 's mandated extractive industry reporting requirements are purposefully intended to go beyond the requirements
of the EITI. Not only does Section 1504 have mandatory reporting for the extraction corporations, and not just the states, it
also requires disclosure about payments at the project level, and
not just aggregation at the general state level. 114 Thus, the new
law provides a valuable tool for transparency and reduction of
secrecy in the extractive industries. The renewable energy sector would benefit from the law being amended to extend to all
natural resource development, including clean energy. Since
there is already concern regarding transparency in payments and
corruption in clean energy, an expansion of the law's mandate
could help reduce secrecy and prevent negative effects from this
burgeoning sector.
PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Focus

FOR SOURCE PROTECTIONS

Since its first utilization in Indonesia in the 1960s, production sharing agreements have dominated extractive industry
contracts and demonstrated a significant shift away from private
industry ownership and control. 115 These agreements are characterized by having the state as the owner of the resource rights
and a foreign company provides the technical and financial
components that the state is lacking. 116 The government retains
ownership, giving it control over aspects of both development
and production. 117 While much of the development risk is
shifted away from the state, the nature of these agreements is
that the state acts as an administrator and main beneficiary of
the arrangement. 118 Before the creation of these agreements,
foreign companies received ownership of the natural resource
and paid different taxes on market value and income. As discussed previously, the international shift to production sharing
agreements and state ownership of resources is argued as being
directly related to the emergence of the resource curse. 119 For
this reason, there should be a focus on having privately owned
clean energy production, services, and delivery, with the state
collecting revenue via taxation.
For large-scale projects, the companies that purchase the
rights and ownership of the production should be reputable and
experienced international entities. Companies that are publically
traded entities have requirements regarding operations and profits that help protect the public's interests. 120 While these information requirements are not by themselves sufficient to prevent
against corruption and financial mismanagement, the requirements of publicly traded companies are significant compared to
closely held corporations and state-owned entities that have no
requirements. Further, taxation may not only help ensure a more
steady revenue stream, but it also facilitates a stronger democracy and a more accountable government. If the energy revenues
go directly to the state coffers through state ownership, revenue
is more difficult to track and the public is more likely to have
uncertainty regarding government budgets and expenditures.
Private companies are also more likely to successfully charge
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LA w & POLICY

and tax the population, thus enabling more citizen oversight of
delivery of service and citizen demand for a democratic voice.
As discussed, the failure to tax may have been a cause of the
resource curse, which helped keep many resource-rich states
autocratic.
SMALLER SCALE

One of the more extreme proposed solutions to the resource
curse stemming from extractive industries is the "leave it in the
ground" approach to address concerns related to scale. 121 Wh"l
1e
abstention from large scale resource development is not going
to happen, there are coherent arguments for managing the pace
of investment and development. Though project development
usually argues for a principle of"more-better-faster", 122 absorptive capacity questions must continue to be raised in states with
weaker institutions and relatively smaller economies. With
natural resource industries, both nonrenewable
and renewable, it is usually argued that the state
should not race to exploit
as much of it as quickly as
it can, but instead plan for
long-term usage that provides a steady economic
stream. 123 It is difficult to
persuade investors to slow
development, especially
as there is enormous pressure to meet certain clean
energy production goals
by the end of the decade
and in each subsequent decade. 124 However, the pressure to
spend and build rapidly can have negative consequences. The
challenge is to balance, on one hand, the considerable need for
more energy production and reduction in pollution from fossil fuel energy sources, while on also ensuring that a state has
sufficient time to absorb the revenue and build the necessary
systems. The idea of billions of dollars of new investment is
positive in principle, but needs significant protections and appropriate scaling. Clean energy may benefit from smaller projects
with more safeguards or singular projects that can be developed
with less government intrusion. Smaller projects could follow
the trend of micro-hydropower or village specific projects as
opposed to massive hydro-power dams. 125 An example of a large
singular project outside government intrusion would be the Lake
Turkana Wind Power project which, despite its size, benefitted
from being built in a remote location with little understanding
from those who would corrupt the process about the magnitude
of the project. 126

themselves, effectiveness of institutions, policies and regulatory
frameworks serve as the bulwark when the other factors place
the state at risk. 127 It has been argued that there can only be a
resource curse when natural resource wealth occurs in a state
with low-quality institutions. 128 This results from poor planning
and quality control by the state government especially when
investments are made to preserve and extend the authority of the
governing elite. 129 For these reasons, Ghana quickly attempted
to strengthen its laws and regulations upon its large discovery of
. the 1aws is
. no t enough . 130
natural resources; however, changmg
Many countries have laws and regulatory structures governing
energy development and the exploitation of natural resources.
These laws are usually insufficient, especially with regards to
international standards of financial management. The lesson
of poor institutions is that its impact on resource development
can be stronger than the desire of the state to avoid the resource
curse. When Sao Tome and
Principe, a tiny island state
of the coast of Africa,
discovered oil, significant
effort was made to learn
from other states' failures
and avoid the resource
curse. 131 Sao Tome and
Principe had a history of
free multiparty democracy,
so it brought in international experts to help
strengthen its oil revenue
management law to comply with international best
practices, including a reserve fund and annual audits. 132 Further,
the state sought to also adopt transparency best practices. 133
However, there is sustained and legitimate concerns regarding
the state's ability to apply the laws and policies, as its lack of a
functioning judiciary and inexperience dealing with oil companies left the state vulnerable and limited in its ability to address
rent-seeking practices. 134
Many of the funders and donors in clean energy development are currently providing technical assistance to help develop
implementation of policies, regulations, and other reforms
needed to appropriately manage renewable energy investment. 135 Further, this technical assistance is being accompanied
by capacity building of the personnel needed to provide government oversight of the resource development. 136 Diverse institutions must be strengthened, and not just those providing direct
regulatory oversight of the energy source. 137 For example, the
customs offices, anticorruption agencies, antimonopoly commissions, and courts must all be strengthened and have their
independence protected. 138 It is insufficient to merely address
the laws and regulatory framework of the state even though those
cannot also not be neglected. The policies and institutions of a
state are interlinked in complex ways, and when the institutions
are weak, even simple policy needs challenge the state. 139 Thus,
international support for renewable energy development must

"Clean energy may benefit
from smaller projects
with more safeguards or
singular projects that can
be developed with less
.
. ''
government zntruszon.

STRENGTHENED INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES AND REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK

Institutional quality and good governance are some of
the biggest suspected factors as to whether a state falls victim
to the resource curse. Though they are not determinative by
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take a comprehensive approach towards improving the laws and
institutions of the state.
CONCLUSION

Renewable energy investment is expected to spike considerably over the next decade with a sudden massive influx of money
flowing into states with questionable absorptive capabilities. A
significant amount of investment will be targeted towards these
developing states in Africa, South Eastern Europe and Asia.

While some of these states are entrenched democracies with
preferences toward private ownership and transparency, some
of states have both the key elements that put natural resource
rich states at risk in the past and do not have the institutional
structures to mitigate these negative factors. Just as states wish
to avoid the resource curse, legal and capacity building efforts
need to take place to ensure that none face a potential renewable
resource curse.
@
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